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Inter-American Development Bank
All around the world in matters of governance decentralization
is the rage. (Bardhan 2005)
As early as 1962, international agencies such as the United Nations and the
World Bank were advising that the decentralization of public service delivery
could serve as a development strategy. The strategy has become even more
prominent over the past 15 years, particularly in education.1 Decentralization
efforts in developed countries include various programs in Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and in at least 44 states in the
United States. Among the developing countries, Burkina Faso, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, India, and Nicaragua have introduced new
programs aimed at devolving power to the local schools. Even the autocratic
government in Pakistan initiated an effort to devolve responsibility for school
management to local authorities, removing a functioning democracy as a nec-
essary precondition for school decentralization.
The move toward more local control is motivated by the belief that de-
Elizabeth King, Guilherme Sedlacek, and the referees provided numerous helpful comments and
suggestions. This research benefited from research support provided by the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the authors’ own and should
not be attributed to the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank, their boards of
directors, or any of their member countries.
1 See Fiske (1996), Bird and Vaillancourt (1998), Walker (2002), and Bray and Mukundan (2003)
for reviews of the progress of efforts to decentralize educational service delivery.
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centralized control will result in better school outcomes, holding constant the
level of resources devoted to the school. Local decision makers should have
more information on local needs and conditions and can adjust resource al-
locations accordingly. Central dictates that are aimed at maximizing welfare
on average may oversupply the service in some areas and undersupply it in
others. Local officials should respond better to local needs because they are
more exposed to pressure from constituents and because they may use quality
public services to attract or retain residents.
Evidence from various countries suggests that decentralized decisions change
how resources are allocated. Faguet (2004) found that when Bolivia devolved
authority from the center to the municipal level, resources were reallocated
away from large-scale projects to smaller education and sanitation projects and
from richer to poorer communities. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) found that
when local community groups were allowed to identify beneficiaries in a
Bangladesh food-transfer program, the benefits were better targeted to poorer
households. Alderman (2001) reported better targeting from decentralized
transfer programs in Albania.
While studies suggest that decentralized authority can alter resource al-
locations and improve targeting to the needy, there is less evidence that desired
outcomes are enhanced by local control. In the case of schooling outcomes,
even the most supportive studies tend to argue that decentralization helps
some schools but not others. There are numerous reasons why local control
may yield poor outcomes. Bardhan (2002, 2005) argues that autonomous
decisions are particularly prone to fail in developing countries. First, popu-
lations may not be mobile, so households may not move because of poor-
quality public services. Second, local officials may be subjected to undue
influence by prominent local families seeking to divert public resources toward
their private needs. A related problem is that there may be no tradition of
monitoring of local officials by local residents, so presumptions of greater
accountability with local control may not hold in fact. Finally, local officials
may lack the necessary experience or skills to manage resources in countries
with few well-educated professionals. Any of these problems could create
difficulties for decentralized school systems.
This study examines how local control of schools affects student outcomes
across eight Latin American countries. We focus on one possible reason for
previous mixed findings regarding the impact of school autonomy and/or
community participation on learning: that local managerial effort is itself a
choice. Any effort to devolve authority to the local school level will require
that local school principals, teachers, parents, or community leaders choose to
exert effort to manage the school. This endogeneity of local school managerial
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effort complicates the interpretation of the cross-sectional pattern of learning
outcomes and reported school autonomy or local community school partici-
pation. We illustrate the problem using a data set composed of individual
child achievement test scores for third and fourth graders in eight Latin
American countries. Among the findings of this study:
1. School autonomy and parental participation vary more within countries
than between countries, suggesting that, in practice, decentralization de-
pends more on local choice than on nationwide decree or legislative fiat.
2. Empirical results confirm that schools in localities with more educated
parents and that are more remotely located are more likely to act auton-
omously, have parental participation, and provide adequate school supplies.
National policies mandating central control moderate but do not eliminate
these tendencies.
3. Schools that practice autonomous decision making do not generate superior
test scores. However, better equipped schools, and schools with more in-
volved parents, have better school outcomes. When school resource and
parental participation are treated as endogenous, their effects become even
more strongly positive and significant.
4. Taken as a whole, the study suggests that devolution of power to local
schools cannot be accomplished by central mandates alone but must take
into account local incentives to manage schools.
I. Background
In Latin America, as in many of the developing regions of the world, efforts to
encourage school autonomy and/or community participation are aimed at making
schools more productive. These efforts have taken numerous forms, including
downsizing the central educational bureaucracy and modifying its functions,
moving authority and responsibility to local levels of government, introducing
school-based management and community-based school financing, initiating
performance-based financing schemes, deregulating the choice of school books
and materials, and expanding school choice through vouchers, charter schools,
or open enrollment programs.2 There is also considerable variation in the person
or persons given responsibility for decision making at the school level (Espı´nola
2001). The local decision maker could be the principal, teachers, parents, mem-
bers of the community, or some combination of the four. The range of local
decisions and responsibilities also varies between curriculum planning, setting
2 For background on these programs, see Lauglo (1995), Bird and Vaillancourt (1998), Whitty,
Power, and Halpin (1998), McEwan and Carnoy (2000), and Peterson and Campbell (2001).
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academic standards, evaluating students, choosing school materials, maintaining
the school, and hiring and evaluating personnel.
In this study, we abstract from the particular mechanism used to affect
decentralization. We concentrate instead on the degree to which two types of
local authority are employed to run the school. The first, school autonomy, is
taken as the power accorded the local school administration to make school-
management decisions. The second, community participation, is taken as the
power accorded the local parents and/or community members to affect those
same decisions. Our aim is to measure the impact of these two loci of control
on student outcomes.
The responsibility for school management rests with the central governments
in some countries, regional authorities in others, and local authorities in the
rest. Many countries allocate a subset of these decisions to each of these levels
(OECD 1998, 2000; Walker 2002; Winkler and Gershberg 2002). A summary
of the government level holding legal responsibility for various school-man-
agement functions in various Latin American countries is presented in table
1 (PREAL 2002).3 There are substantial differences across countries in how
decisions are made regarding teacher hiring, evaluation, and compensation. In
Argentina and Peru, hiring promotion and salary decisions are made at the
state or provincial level, while in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, it is
the national authorities that manage personnel matters. In Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia, and Honduras, teachers are hired at the state, municipal, or even school
level, but salaries are set at the central level. The loci for decisions regarding
school-facility maintenance, buying textbooks, and setting curriculum also
vary both between and within countries. Maintenance of facilities and equip-
ment is taken at the municipal or school level in most countries, except in
Argentina and Peru, where the semicentral level governs. In Bolivia, the Do-
minican Republic, and Honduras, the choice of textbooks and curricula is
controlled at the national level, while Brazil has devolved these decisions to
the state and municipal levels. In Peru, textbooks are selected by families.
Overall, the educational systems in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic are
highly nationalized; those of Brazil, Chile, and Colombia are more locally
managed; and those of Argentina and Peru are somewhere in between.
Several studies have attempted to assess how changes in the locus of school
3 PREAL based its evaluations on a review of national policies and legislation. The 2002 survey
is contemporaneous with our data set, but a more recent update by PREAL showed little change
in the locus of control over schools in Latin American countries.
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authority have affected schooling outcomes in Latin America.4 Jimenez and
Sawada (1999) found that student attendance and test performance were higher
in the EDUCO schools in El Salvador, schools that were managed by local parent
committees. Vegas (2002) reports that in Chile, public and private schools that
exercise more teacher autonomy and local control have higher test scores. In
Argentina, schools that adopted local control earlier in a national decentralization
effort appear to have superior student outcomes (Galiani, Gertler, and Schar-
grodsky 2008). King and Ozler (2005) found that schools that practiced more
autonomy in Nicaragua had improved student test scores compared to schools
that were not autonomous. At the aggregate level, Lindaman and Thurmaier
(2002) found a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and im-
provements in national indices of human development. A general conclusion
arising from these studies is that reforms that push the locus of decision making
toward the school tend to produce improved student performance.
However, the relationship between more autonomy and better learning
remains far from universal (Coleman 1990; Hannaway and Carnoy 1993; Sav-
edoff 1998; Finn, Manno, and Vanourek 2001; Reinikka and Svensson 2004).
For any of the reasons suggested by Bardhan (2002), local school managers
may fail to manage schools as effectively as would central management. How-
ever, even in the above-cited studies that report positive average impacts of
decentralization on student outcomes, the improved results are not found in
all schools. In the EDUCO schools, the positive results are concentrated among
the schools with the most active community participation and with better
school inputs. In Argentina, the benefits are strongest in the wealthier districts
and those that decentralized earliest.5 In Chile and Nicaragua, it was the schools
that reported having more autonomy or parental input that had the better
student performance, but not all of the schools that had the legal right or
obligation behaved autonomously. In all four country cases, the gains from
decentralization come mainly from schools that actually engaged in local school
4 Our emphasis in this article is on the public school system. There is considerable interest in the
use of private school vouchers as a means of decentralizing control of schools, but that process is
considerably different from the move toward local control of public schools. Somer, McEwan, and
Willms (2004) found that across a sample of 10 Latin American countries, students perform
systematically better in private than in public schools, but the effect is driven primarily by dif-
ferences in peers and, to a lesser extent, socioeconomic status across public and private students.
Angrist et al. (2002) and Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) demonstrate that in randomized
samples in Colombia, students who obtained private school vouchers in a lottery performed better
in school and graduated with greater frequency than did the sample of students who did not get
the vouchers.
5 This last comment is a bit misleading, as the reference group in the Galiani et al. (2008) study
is the schools that were always decentralized, so the gains from decentralization are measured
relative to continually autonomous schools rather than nonautonomous schools.
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control (de facto autonomy) and not from all the schools that had the legal
authority to manage schools (de jure autonomy).
The contribution of this study is to formally confront the decision by the
local authority of whether or not to exercise control over the school. Rather
than presuming the local school managerial effort is determined exclusively
by legislative fiat, we assume that the local authority can choose how much
effort to exert in running the school. As a consequence, the exertion of local
authority must be treated as an endogenous variable, and estimates that treat
the exercise of local authority as exogenous will be biased.
One example of discretion exercised regarding whether to exert local ini-
tiative in school management is the Colombia voucher program. While national
in scope, some municipalities opted not to participate. King, Orazem, and
Wohlgemuth (1999) demonstrate that municipal decisions regarding whether
to participate depended on local fiscal capacity and the size of potential local
benefits. Even the experiences of localities in an experimental installation of
a decentralization program will reflect a local choice of whether to accept
responsibility for the school. Of the EDUCO schools in El Salvador and the
Consejos Directivos (autonomous school boards) program in Nicaragua, only those
electing to manage more intensively (de facto autonomy) as opposed to just
signing the contract (de jure or legally scheduled autonomy) had measurable
successes. Unclear is whether the success is due to the decentralization or to
the local attributes that may have affected willingness to manage.
The next section presents an estimation strategy for measuring the impact
of school autonomy and parental participation on schooling outcomes. The
data set we use in the estimation is described in Section III. Section IV discusses
the empirical findings, and the last section suggests ways that the study could
be extended.
II. Estimation Issues
Past studies of school productivity (Glewwe 2002; Glewwe and Kremer 2006)
have pointed to child, household, teacher, and school characteristics in ex-
plaining school performance. This study adds measures of local control over
the school as additional inputs into the educational production function. To
be precise, the observed test score for child i in school j in country k can be
described by an equation of the form
q p f(z , x , a , a , h ), (1)ijk ijk jk 1jk 2jk ijk
where qijk is the ith child’s test score; zijk includes attributes of the child’s
parents, household, and community; and xjk represents the level of educational
materials provided in school j. Local managerial effort in school j is divided
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into two components: a1jk is the autonomous managerial effort exercised by
the school principal, and a2jk is the parental and local community participation
in the management of the school. The term is a random error in the child’s
test score, including, for example, innate ability.
In principle, one could estimate a linearized form of equation (1) using
ordinary least squares. However, the principal and the parents will be deciding
whether to exert managerial effort in the school, in part, based on their an-
ticipated impacts on school outputs. The level of school inputs will also depend
on local provision as well as central distribution of school supplies. As a result,
xjk, a1jk, and a2jk are all jointly selected with qijk. If the parents and school
officials make these decisions with knowledge of the children’s innate abilities,
then least-squares estimation of equation (1) will be biased.
However, we would expect that the jth school in country k makes decisions
on xjk, a1jk, and a2jk such that
6
x p x(Z , A ,  )jk jk k xjk
a p a (Z , A ,  )1jk 1 jk k 1jk
a p a (Z , A ,  ), (2)2jk 2 jk k 2jk
where Zjk is a vector of community-level measures of parent, school, and
community attributes that could potentially affect the productivity of the
school; Ak is the central authority’s rules regulating school authority; and the
are vectors of random error terms. The empirical work that follows exploitsijk
the variation across countries in constitutional authority over school resource
allocation in order to identify xjk, a1jk, and a2jk in estimating equation (1). We
justify this estimation strategy in greater detail below after we introduce the
data set.
III. Data
To investigate the impact of local school management on school outcomes, we
use a multicountry survey carried out in 1997 over eight Latin American
countries by the Latin American Laboratory of Quality of Education (LLECE).
Our sample includes third and fourth graders in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
6 An earlier version of the study (Gunnarsson et al. 2006) contains a model in which local school
authorities decide how much administrative effort to exert in order to maximize the output of the
school, given information on the cost of exerting effort. The model yields reduced-form equations
consistent with eq. (2).
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Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Peru.7 The samples
were constructed to include public and private schools, and schools in met-
ropolitan, urban, and rural areas. The samples are not strictly proportional,
noticeably undersampling rural children in Brazil and Chile and undersampling
urban/metro children in the Dominican Republic.8 We include only the public
schools in this analysis, as the private schools would not face the same con-
straints on local school control.
Children in the selected classrooms were given tests of mathematics and
language. The same exam was administered in each country, with the exception
that the language exam was in Portuguese in Brazil and Spanish elsewhere.
The mathematics exam had a maximum score of 32, and the language exam
had a top score of 19. We use the raw exam scores as our measure of child
schooling outcomes.
In addition to collecting test scores on sampled children in each school,
self-applied questionnaires were given to the school principal, to the teachers,
to parents (or legal guardians) of the tested children, and to the children
themselves. Table A1 reports the variable definitions and information sources,
and table A2 reports the sample statistics for those variables. For apparently
random causes, the number of observations for children taking the mathematics
and language exams differed, but sample statistics did not differ much between
the groups of students taking the two exams.9
We should comment on Cuba, a country included in the LLECE database
but which we exclude from our analysis. Cuba’s children have test scores that
averaged about one standard deviation above the mean across the other coun-
tries. Carnoy (2007) attributes the Cuban success to a nondemocratic, centrally
dictated, and strictly enforced system that removes the ability of local school
officials or parents to make choices that could retard a child’s academic success.
Such a political system is far removed from our maintained hypothesis that
local principals or parents decide whether or not to manage the school or
7 The LLECE also collected data on Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela. The LLECE
deleted the data for Costa Rica from their public use sample apparently because the data failed
their standards for reliability and comparability. We excluded other countries when they lacked
information necessary to estimate the models. Paraguay did not include information on school
inputs or parent participation for 90% of the schools. Venezuela and Mexico did not include
information on child age, a key variable explaining child performance in school. The Venezuela
data also were plagued with missing information, while our Mexico data also did not distinguish
between public and private schools.
8 LLECE (1998) provides a detailed description of the sampling.
9 Each child was supposed to take both exams, but some took only one. In addition, there were
apparently randomly occurring problems with matching test scores to parent, teacher, and school
variables.
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accept central authority. As Carnoy (2007, 43) summarizes, “the degree of
political control inherent in the Cuban state over the past 45 years . . . is far
beyond anything but the more extreme versions of social control . . . currently
appearing in democratic country political debates.”10
A. Empirical Deﬁnitions of School Autonomy, Community Participation,
and School Supplies
The LLECE survey contains multiple measures of the degree of autonomy
exercised by the school. Each school principal answered questions regarding
the school’s authority in hiring staff, allocating the budget, designing curric-
ulum, disciplining and evaluating students, and organizing extracurricular
activities.11 As shown in section A of table 2, schools have the least autonomy
in hiring and paying teachers and in allocating budgets, while student pro-
motions and extracurricular activities are more typically controlled by the
school. Our measure of school autonomy, a1jk, is the weighted sum of these
responses, where the weights were generated by estimating the first principal
component of the principals’ responses. The first principal component explained
52% of the covariation in the eight responses used in the LLECE sample. All
responses entered with positive weights, suggesting that the various indicators
of school autonomy are mutually reinforcing. None of the later results we
report were sensitive to variation in the factors included in the autonomy
measure.
In the top section of table 3, we report the average weighted autonomy
score by country. It is useful to see how the practice of school autonomy
compares to the legal mandates summarized in table 1. Across these countries,
the greatest self-reported autonomy is in Brazil and Colombia, countries with
relatively decentralized systems in table 1. The least self-reported autonomy
is found in Honduras and the Dominican Republic, two of the more centralized
systems.
Parental and community participation, a2jk, is taken as the weighted sum
of teacher responses to questions regarding parental participation in the school.
As before, the weights are set by principal component analysis. A single factor
10 There are some peculiarities in the Cuban data that may cause some to question Carnoy’s
conclusions regarding the source of the Cuban advantage. Whereas the Cuban system is characterized
as overwhelmingly authoritarian, it nevertheless has the highest level of self-reported principal
autonomy and parental participation of all the countries in the LLECE sample. Either this indicates
that the responses to the LLECE questions may be less than candid, or it means that the source
of the Cuban advantage cannot be the strict adherence to the dictates of the education minister.
11 While the questions are not necessarily reflective of the principal’s own exercise of authority as
opposed to that exercised by the school staff as a whole, it is convenient to refer to the principal
as the school manager.
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY INFORMATION ON CONSTRUCTION OF MEASURES OF AUTONOMY, PARTICIPATION,
AND SCHOOL SHORTAGES
A. Responses used in the creation of the autonomy variable
Asked of principal: With 1 p no autonomy, 2 p some autonomy, and 3 p high autonomy,
what degree of autonomy does the school have in:
Hiring personnel? (1.36; .26)a
Allocating budget? (1.66; .38)
Choosing textbooks and materials? (2.32; .42)
Admissions, suspensions or expulsions? (2.36; .29)
Student promotions? (2.78; .31)
Setting disciplinary regulations? (2.46; .49)
Setting curricular priorities? (2.50; .62)
Planning and executing extracurricular activities? (2.67; .46)
First factor loading using the iterated principal factor method explained 52% of the covaria-
tion across the eight autonomy indicators.
B. Responses used in the creation of the participation variable
Asked of the teacher: With 1 p low, 2 p medium, and 3 p high, what is the level of paren-
tal participation in:
School activities? (1.80; .65)a
Interest in the child’s development? (1.69; .65)
First-factor loading using the iterated principal factor method explained 99% of the covaria-
tion across the three participation indicators.
C. Responses used in the creation of the shortage variable
Asked of the teacher: With 1p adequate and 2 p inadequate; what is the level of:
Classroom lighting? (1.31; .48)a
Classroom temperature? (1.49; .38)
Classroom hygiene? (1.26; .49)
Classroom security? (1.42; .59)
Classroom acoustics? (1.54; .38)
Asked of the teacher: With 0 p yes and 1 p no, do the students have:
Language textbooks? (.22; .45)
Math textbooks? (.45; .50)
Asked of the teacher: With 0 p yes and 1 p no, are there enough textbooks so that the
students have:
One textbook each? (.57; .43)
First-factor loading using the iterated principal factor method explained 54% of the covaria-
tion across the eight inadequacy indicators.
D. Correlation between aggregate autonomy, participation, and shortage measures
Autonomy Participation Shortage
Autonomy 1.00
Participation .06 1.00
Shortage .13 .21 1.00
E. ANOVA Evaluation of autonomy, participation, and shortage variables
ANOVA analysis of autonomy:
91% of the variation in autonomy is within country
9% of the variation in autonomy is across countries
ANOVA analysis of participation:
94% of the variation in participation is within country
6% of the variation in participation is across countries
ANOVA analysis of inadequacy:
74% of the variation in shortage is within countries
26% of the variation in shortage is across countries
a Average value and factor loading in parentheses for the mathematics sample.
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loading captures virtually all the covariation in the responses, as can be seen
in section B of table 2. It is harder to relate parental participation to the
constitutionally set locus of control in table 1. The two countries with the
greatest parental participation, Colombia and the Dominican Republic, are at
opposite ends of the range of legal centralization.
A weighted sum of teacher responses to questions regarding the inadequacy
of the quantity or quality of school supplies is used as an inverse measure of
xjk. Teachers were asked to indicate whether various facilities and academic
materials were insufficient for academic purposes. Section C of table 2 lists
the indicators of school facilities and materials. The first principal component
explained 54% of the covariation across the eight instruments used. As with
the other aggregations, all the factor loadings were positive, indicating that
shortages in one area typically were accompanied by inadequacies in the other
school materials and facilities. The most widespread shortages were the lack
of sufficient textbooks per student. Over 40% of teachers also complained
about classroom temperature and poor acoustics. Shortages are reported most
frequently in the most centralized system, Bolivia, and the fewest shortages
are reported in the least centralized systems, such as Brazil and Chile.
Our use of factor analysis to combine measures is somewhat unusual in the
economics literature, although it is more commonly employed by other social
science researchers. Our use of these combined measures of school management
and inputs rather than each individual subcomponent is justified on both
pragmatic and statistical grounds. First, when there are multiple measures of
the same conceptual variable, each subject to random error, averaged values
of the measures are more reliable than are any single measure. This is partic-
ularly important in our setting where there is no single agreed-upon measure
of school autonomy or community participation in the literature. Second, as
we saw above, there is a high degree of correlation among the various individual
measures of these conceptual variables. Using many coefficients to represent
the impact of a single conceptual variable, say school quality, spreads the
quality effect across many potentially imprecisely estimated coefficients. Con-
centrating the impact into a single metric aids both precision and interpret-
ability.12 Finally, on pragmatic grounds, we do not have enough instruments
to separately identify multiple measures of school autonomy, participation, and
input sufficiency.
12 The practice of estimating educational production functions with numerous measures of school
quality included as regressors has yielded few consistent results across studies. Multicollinearity
and endogeneity are two of the main problems confronting this literature. See Glewwe and Kremer
(2006) for a recent discussion of the findings from educational production functions in developing
countries.
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B. Stylized Facts regarding Autonomy, Participation, and Shortage
School autonomy and community participation are different. One might presume
that schools with greater autonomy on personnel, curricular, or disciplinary
matters would also have more parental or community participation in the
school. However, in our sample, the two measures of local effort are virtually
independent. The simple correlation between the two measures across countries
is only weakly positive (sec. D in table 2). While it is possible that other
measures of parental participation would be more strongly tied to school
autonomy,13 parental participation and school autonomy are clearly unique
empirical constructs in our analysis.
The exercise of local autonomy is a choice only weakly driven by constitutionally
assigned school responsibilities. We presume that the exercise of local control
over the school is subject to local choice, an assumption that would seem at
variance with the existence of constitutionally assigned local and central re-
sponsibilities for the management of schools. While we will ultimately exploit
the correspondence between constitutional responsibilities summarized in table
1 and the local exercise of school management, the linkage is hardly definitive.
Evidence that local autonomy is subject to choice is found in the ANOVA
estimates reported at the bottom of table 2. Efforts to devolve control of schools
from central to local authorities have involved the passage of new laws man-
dating the transference of power from the center to the periphery. If this
assignment of responsibility were effectively enforced, we would expect that
most of the variation in school autonomy in our data set would be across
countries and not within countries. To the extent that the legal environment
also dictates parental freedom to participate in local schools or it provides for
a level of support for public schools, we might expect that most of the variation
in parental participation and in the adequacy of school supplies would also
occur across and not within countries. However, only 9% of the variation in
school autonomy, 6% of the variation in participation, and 26% of the variation
in supply shortages could be explained by differences across countries. The
great majority of the variation in decentralized school management and school
quality occurs within and not between countries.
These findings are striking. Apparently, even in centralized systems, local
schools can take the initiative to design or adopt strategies that could alter
the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the teaching-learning process. Alterna-
tively, in a decentralized system, schools that do not feel capable of allocating
13 Our measure concentrates on parental interest in education and participation in school activities.
Questions do not concentrate on parental participation on school committees, fund-raising cam-
paigns, or other more formal participation in school management that might be more comple-
mentary with the principal’s efforts to manage the school.
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school resources may simply adopt central policies or guidelines, as would
happen in a centralized system.
Instruments and other variables. The apparent endogeneity of local school
autonomy a1jk, parental participation a2jk, and school input provision xjk will
require plausible instruments that would shift the probability of local effort
but will not be directly tied to child test scores. We opted to use cross-country
variation in measures of Ak. Even if the constitutionally mandated locus of
control over schools resides with the central government, it does not necessarily
prevent the exercise of local control over the school, but they will raise the
cost of exerting local authority. This strategy is similar in spirit to that used
by Angrist and Krueger (1991), Tyler (2003), and Rothstein (2007), who used
variation in state truancy laws to identify the amount of time individuals spend
in school and/or child labor in studies of returns to schooling. Truancy laws
do not prevent children from illegally avoiding school, but they do raise the
costs of dropping out in states with stricter laws.14
Our measures of Ak are taken from the information summarized in table
1. Each type of managerial responsibility was given a value of 1 for local, 2
for state or provincial, and 3 for national control. The average score of the
first four columns was taken to represent constitutional authority for school
personnel (hiring and promotions); the average of the next two columns re-
flected authority for school facilities (inventory and maintenance); and the
average of the last two columns represented authority for curriculum (books
and curriculum). Higher values indicate that more centralized management
is constitutionally mandated. These measures are highly correlated with one
another so that countries that have centralized decision making in one area
tend to have more centralized control of others. As a consequence, we will be
more interested in the joint effect of these three measures of central control
as opposed to any one measure.15
14 Earlier versions of this article also used variation across schools in the principal’s managerial
experience and in the socioeconomic status of the community as additional instruments. Solon,
Page, and Duncan (2000) and Oreopoulos (2003) found that community attributes had no effect
on human capital outcomes once household attributes were controlled, suggesting that the socio-
economic status of the community should be a legitimate instrument for the exercise of local school
management. Nevertheless, we agree with the referees that local community attributes could
plausibly have a direct effect on school outcomes in this application, in addition to their impact
on school managerial decisions, invalidating them as an instrument. Although our results are
qualitatively similar when we use the principal and community attributes, we focus our attention
on the results that use only the constitutional rules as instruments.
15 Our identifying assumption is that constitutional responsibility for the management of school
personnel, curricula, and infrastructure is not assigned in response to student performance on these
tests. That assumption seems reasonable in that the legal responsibilities were set across the countries
before the tests were conceived. Nevertheless, it is possible that these constitutional provisions are
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The remaining variables are largely self-defining. Measures of Zjk are in-
tended to capture differences in the home and community socioeconomic
environment that could affect both the incentives and capacity to support local
schools, as well as individual child learning. These measures include parental
education, books in the home, an indicator of whether the parents speak Spanish
or Portuguese, and a series of dummy variables indicating community size.
IV. Regression Analysis
A. Determinants of School Autonomy, Parental Participation, and Adequacy
of School Supplies
We begin with the reduced-form representations of equation (2), explaining
variation in school autonomy, parental participation, and shortage of school
materials. We performed the estimation at the school level using school-level
averages of child and household variables.16 Estimates correct for clustering at
the country level. Results are reported in table 4.
Of greatest interest is how the exercise of local public school control is
moderated by national policies. The effect of local autonomous decision making
is moderated by national policies that place the locus of control at the center.
In all cases, the three measures of central authority are jointly significant,
although not individually significant in the shortage regression. The individual
effects have mixed signs, but the summed effect of the three measures con-
sistently shows that centralized locus of power is correlated with lower reported
local effort to manage schools. Evaluated at sample means for the eight coun-
tries, the effect of constitutionally mandated centralized school management
is to lower school autonomy by 13%, to lower parental participation by 13%,
and to increase shortages of school supplies by 25%.
There is strong evidence that local school managerial effort is enhanced
when the students have more educated parents. The joint test of the hypothesis
that the three measures of parental attributes have no impact is strongly rejected
in each equation. Moreover, evaluating the summed effects at sample means,
parental education, book ownership, and language skills together raises the
average index of school autonomy by 36%, raises parental participation by
72%, and lowers the shortage index by 30%.
correlated with excluded factors that affect average performance on tests. We can say that our
instruments were not significantly correlated either individually or as a group with cross-country
variation in per capita income, poverty rates, public debt, or income inequality.
16 We also estimated the autonomy, participation, and shortage equations at the individual level,
correcting for clustering, and obtained virtually identical results to those reported in table 4.
Nevertheless, as pointed out by a referee, the school-level estimates are more consistent with the
conceptual model that these decisions about local control of the school are being made by the
school or community.
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TABLE 4
LEAST-SQUARES REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING AUTONOMY, PARTICIPATION, AND SHORTAGE
Variable Autonomy Participation Shortage
Instruments:
Hiring and promotions 1.748** .493 1.212
(.053) (.403) (.707)
Books and curriculum 1.566** .346* .699
(.379) (.176) (.417)
Inventory and maintenance .829** .360* .058
(.216) (.162) (.258)
Child:
Age .043 .008 .039
(.012) (.070) (.072)
Boy .252 .021 .047
(.330) (.136) (.302)
Parent/household:
P Educ 1.664 .556 .312
(1.030) (.552) (.418)
P Books .550** .379** .305
(.185) (.092) (.227)
P Spanish .082 .259* .797**
(.404) (.121) (.230)
Community:
Small urban .433** .040 .266**
(.128) (.127) (.068)
Rural-adj .437** .207** .206**
(.071) (.085) (.080)
Rural-iso .205 .329* .210
(.234) (.143) (.168)
Constant 5.736** .828 3.508**
(1.591) (1.039) (1.311)
R2 .195 .123 .277
N 410 410 410
Diagnostic tests of the instruments:
F-testa 14.05** 7.17** 14.52**
Summed effect (%) .98 (13%) .29 (13%) 1.02 (27%)
Note. Cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses for regression output. P-values in pa-
rentheses for F-tests. Regressions are run on the school-level clustering by country and include
dummy variables controlling for missing values. Regressions using the language sample are
similar.
a Test of hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments are jointly equal to zero.
* Indicates significance at the .1 level.
** Indicates significance at the .05 level.
Using schools in metropolitan centers as the reference point, we find that
it is the schools in smaller urban and rural areas that are the most likely to
exert autonomous effort and to have parental participation. Rural schools are
also less likely than metropolitan schools to experience supply shortages, al-
though schools in the central cities are supplied better than those in other
urban environs. Apparently, schools in the center are willing (or are compelled)
to accept central control while schools on the periphery are allowed to (or have
to) develop more local control.
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The results from table 4 show clearly that the local exercise of control over
public schools is not a random occurrence but is strongly tied to variables
that should indicate local managerial capacity of the principal, the community,
and the parents. These efforts are moderated but not reversed by constitutional
mandates reserving school management to the central authority. Consequently,
it is incorrect to presume that local public school management is exogenous.17
The next subsections illustrate how conclusions regarding the productivity of
local school management are sensitive to assumptions of the exogeneity or
endogeneity of measured local managerial effort.
B. Test Score Estimation Assuming Exogenous Autonomy, Participation,
and Input Shortage
We first discuss the results from direct estimation of equation (1) without
correcting for the endogeneity of autonomy, participation, and school inputs.
The unit of observation is the individual child, but all estimates correct for
clustering at the school level. These results are reported in the second and
fourth columns of table 5.
The specification may seem sparse compared to other educational production
functions that often include many school attributes. However, our three school
measures are aggregations of 18 different factors, so one could view our spec-
ification as a restricted form of a more general specification more commonly
employed in previous work. The results do accord well with common findings.
Boys do better in math while girls do better in language. The various indicators
of parental attributes are uniformly positive and jointly significant with the
strongest effects for books in the home and parental language ability. The
highest scores were in the more urban schools, although the coefficients were
not always precisely estimated.
Turning to our main interest, when treated as exogenous, school autonomy
has no significant effect on test scores. Parental participation raises language
test scores significantly but does not have a statistically significant effect on
mathematics scores. Even when significant, the parental participation effect is
small, amounting to less than one more point on the test from a one standard
deviation increase in parental participation. Shortages had a significant negative
effect on both test scores, but again, the effect was modest. A one standard
17 We should reiterate that we do not include private schools in the analysis. Private schools are
autonomous by definition, and their exercise of autonomy would not be expected to change with
the level of centralized authority mandated for public schools. We do note that, consistent with
expectations, private school principals included in the LLECE samples reported higher levels of
autonomy than did their public school counterparts.
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TABLE 5
LEAST-SQUARES AND TWO-STAGE LEAST-SQUARES EQUATIONS EXPLAINING TEST SCORES
Mathematics Language
Variable
Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS)a
Two-Stage
Least Squaresb
Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS)a
Two-Stage
Least Squaresb
Autonomy .069 .118 .101 .209
(.239) (.153) (.108) (.119)
Participation .221 3.607** .335** 2.395**
(.255) (.422) (.123) (.183)
Shortage .457** 2.787** .350** .249**
(.212) (.161) (.116) (.038)
Child:
Age .059 .112** .083 .137**
(.079) (.038) (.047) (.027)
Boy .468** .508** .465** .402**
(.153) (.112) (.097) (.082)
Parent/household:
P Educ .600 .249 .908** .626**
(.467) (.367) (.297) (.207)
P Books 1.177** .795** .804** .638**
(.128) (.081) (.075) (.056)
P Spanish 1.963** .271 1.576** 1.020**
(.736) (.306) (.504) (.224)
Community:
Small urban .836 1.293** .159 .017
(.707) (.186) (.285) (.116)
Rural-adj 1.078* 1.798** 1.527** 1.504**
(.650) (.169) (.351) (.122)
Rural-iso .119 1.011** .350 .338
(1.273) (.355) (.775) (.242)
Constant 9.518** 15.220** 8.052** .208
(2.456) (1.698) (1.258) (.900)
R2 .078 .120 .106 .117
N 10,411 10,411 11,451 11,451
Note. Cluster-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
a Autonomy, participation, and shortage treated as exogenous and controlling for clustering at the school
level.
b Two-stage least-squares estimation treating autonomy, participation, and shortage as endogenous,
using the instruments listed in table A1. Two-stage estimates were obtained from running the first-stage
estimation on the school level, correcting for clustering at the country level, and then running the second
stage using the first-stage predicted level, correcting for clustering at the school level. The second-stage
estimates were bootstrapped to generate correct standard errors.
* Indicates significance at the .1 level.
** Indicates significance at the .05 level. Regressions also include dummy variables controlling for missing
values.
deviation increase in shortage resulted in less than a 0.5 point decrease in test
scores.
C. Estimates Controlling for Endogeneity
Results controlling for endogeneity are reported in the third and fifth columns
of table 5. Estimation was complicated by the differences in units of obser-
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vation: the school level in the first stage and the child level in the second.
This prevented us from using a joint estimation strategy, so we opted for a
two-stage estimation procedure and then corrected the standard errors using
a bootstrap procedure.18
Compared to the least-squares estimates, the estimated school autonomy
effects turn uniformly negative but remain insignificant for both mathematics
and language. The estimated parental participation effect becomes much larger
and statistically significant. School-supply shortages remain statistically sig-
nificant and become more important in the case of the mathematics test.
The parental participation result can be rationalized if parents participate
more readily in the school when they observe the school performing poorly
given its resources. If true, the least-squares estimate would be biased down-
ward because of the negative influence of test scores on parental participation.
Alternatively, parental participation may be measured with error, so the least-
squares coefficients are subject to attenuation bias. In either event, the estimates
suggest that parental participation is more useful for school outcomes than is
suggested when the factor is treated as exogenous in least-squares regressions.
Encouraging parental participation appears to be a more promising avenue for
improving school outcomes than mandating school autonomy.
Recall that even when significant, parental participation and supply short-
ages had a very small impact on student test scores when estimated using
ordinary least squares. Correcting for endogeneity, a one standard deviation
increase in parental participation raises the mathematics score by 2.4 questions
(7.6%) and the language score by 1.6 questions (8.4%). A one standard de-
viation increase in supply shortages lowers the mathematics test score by 2.7
points (8.5%) and lowers the language score by 0.2 points (1.3%). Although
we do not have prior estimates to compare with our findings, we believe that
if parental participation or supply shortages are to have any impact, these
estimates seem to be of reasonable magnitudes.
We note again that all of our observations of student outcomes are con-
ditional on the child being in attendance at this particular school. We do not
have information on children in the neighborhood who attend private schools
or who have dropped out of school. As such, all of our schooling outcomes
must be interpreted as conditioned on the choice to attend a public school.
18 The first-stage regressions were run on the school-level clustering for countries, and the second-
stage regressions were run on the child-level clustering for schools. The second-stage standard
errors were computed by generating 1,000 samples of schools with replacement, merging the
predicted values into the second stage and then generating the sampling distribution of the second-
stage estimates.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Fri, 28 Oct 2016 13:57:00 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Gunnarsson et al. 45
If the decision to send a child to public school is influenced by the degree of
local autonomy, parental participation, or the adequacy of school supplies, the
distribution of children in public schools may differ depending on these factors.
We have no means of judging the potential impact of such sorting on our
results.
C. Extensions
When we began this study, we were concerned that we could not distinguish
between management exercised by local school teachers or principals from
management exercised by parents or the community. In practice, the two
measures turned out to be nearly uncorrelated, suggesting that our concern
was unfounded. Nevertheless, we replicated the analysis using only one local
management measure at a time. These results are in the second and third
columns of each group of estimates reported in table 6. When treated as
endogenous, and parental participation is excluded, school autonomy appears
to have a positive and statistically significant impact on test scores. This result
suggests that one may be misled about the importance of local school man-
agement if the role of parents or the community is not considered jointly with
the role of the principal.
A second question concerns the use of country-specific fixed effects. We
cannot control simultaneously for country fixed effects and for endogenous
local school management because our source of identification is the country-
specific constitutional locus of authority over schools. Nevertheless, we can
examine how fixed effects alter our least-squares estimates. Comparing fixed-
effect estimates in column 5 with those in column 2, we find that conclusions
regarding parental participation and autonomy are the same, but school sup-
plies are no longer statistically significant.19 We do not know what would
happen if we could impose fixed effects on our preferred specification.
Another question concerned our use of the factor-weighted sums of the eight
autonomy, two parental participation, and eight shortage measures instead of
adding these 18 variables separately. Again, we cannot perform the analysis
correcting for endogeneity because we lack sufficient instruments, but we can
compare results under the exogeneity assumption. To make the comparison,
we aggregated the individual factor coefficients at their sample means. To be
precise, letting vk be the regression coefficient on the kth factor, which has
mean value mk, column 6 reports the weighted sum as wellq/wp  v mk kk
19 This is not surprising in that less than 10% of the variation in autonomy and participation is
due to cross-country variation. In contrast, 26% of the variation in shortage occurs across countries.
See table 2 for details.
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as the standard deviation of the sum for each element of . Thewp (x, a , a )1 2
standard errors are as large as one would expect when aggregating across many
imprecise parameters.20 Nevertheless, the signs are similar to what we find
using our aggregated management measures, although the estimated coeffi-
cients on autonomy are even more negative and those on parental participation
more positive than in our preferred specification in column 2. It seems apparent
that our use of aggregations of individual management measures is not driving
our conclusions.21
Finally, we repeated the estimation of the test score equation separately for
each country. Again, this prevents us from using cross-country variation to
identify endogenous local school-management decisions, so we can only per-
form the least-squares analysis. Coefficient estimates for the three variables are
reported in the bottom section of table 3. The results mimic the mixed findings
from earlier studies that treated local school autonomy, parental participation,
and school inputs as exogenous. Many coefficients are individually insignificant
in the country-specific equations, and all three variables have instances of sign
switching across countries. These results indicate why treating local school
management and school inputs as endogenous may be important for correctly
assessing their impacts on student outcomes.
V. Conclusions
A sample encompassing eight Latin American countries shows no evidence
that more autonomous schools perform better than less autonomous schools.
These conclusions are not sensitive to controls for the plausible endogeneity
of school autonomy. However, after correcting for endogeneity, the impact of
parental participation on student test scores is consistently positive and sig-
nificant. Reducing shortages in school supplies and infrastructure also improves
student outcomes consistently.
Parental participation and school autonomy are not random occurrences.
They are positively influenced by parental human capital and the size and
remoteness of the community. Whether because of perceived local school needs
or the lack of central supervision, it is the schools in less populated and more
20 This demonstrates why our use of principal components to aggregate across similar factors may
yield better inferences about the educational production process than would including all of the
highly correlated and conceptually similar factors in the regression.
21 Joint tests of significance of the individual factors failed to reject the null hypothesis that all
the coefficients were zero. We also tested whether we could accept the restrictions implied by the
use of a weighted average of the factors that translated the 18 factors into three. Restrictions were
accepted at standard significance levels in the case of the two participation measures and the eight
shortage factors but rejected for autonomy. We can only perform the test assuming exogeneity, so
these tests are just suggestive.
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remotely located areas that are most likely to exert managerial effort. Our
finding that local school management is a matter of choice seems to accord
well with findings by other researchers. In Colombia, the cities that participated
in the voucher program were those with the strongest fiscal standing and that
had the administrative capacity to manage the program. In Argentina, the
areas that decentralized first were those with the strongest socioeconomic stand-
ing. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, positive results from decentralization were
concentrated among the schools that actually chose to exert effort and not all
that were accorded the right to manage.
These findings should give pause to the widespread clamor for decentrali-
zation. It is highly likely that schools that willingly manage schools perform
better than if they did not exert that effort. However, it seems clear that the
choice to manage is largely a local and not a central decision. Consequently,
policies should grant autonomy in circumstances where the local community
would willingly exercise local control. For the majority of schools that would
choose not to manage locally, centralized managerial decisions regarding the
allocation of school resources and other administrative decisions may yield the
best results.
Appendix
TABLE A1
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Variable Description
Endogenous variables:
Math score (q) Mathematics test score out of 32 possible (C)
Language score (q) Language test score out of 19 possible (C)
Autonomy (a1) Composite variable measuring the level of school autonomy (Pr)
Participation (a2) Composite variable measuring the level of parental participa-
tion (T)
Shortage (x) Composite variable measuring the inadequacy of school sup-
plies and facilities (T)
Exogenous variables:
Child:
Age Student age (years) (C)
Boy Dummy if student is a boy (C)
Parent/household:
P Educ Average education of parent(s) or guardian(s) (P)
P Books Number of books in student’s home (P)
P Spanish Dummy if parents speak Spanish (Portuguese) with their chil-
dren (P)
Community: (Reference: Urbanized zone in the capital area)
Small urban Dummy indicating if school is located in a marginal zone in the cap-
ital or in a large city or town with more than 100,000 people (S)
Rural-adj Dummy indicating if school is located in a town/village with less
than 100,000 people or in a rural area in close proximity
close to a town (S)
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TABLE A1 (Continued )
Variable Description
Rural-iso Dummy indicating if school is located in a rural area with less than
500 people and located more than 50 km from a town (S)
Instruments:
Hiring and promotions Average of the level of centralization of decision making in hir-
ing staff and regulating salaries and promotions (1 p school
control, 3 p national control; PREAL)
Books and curriculum Average of the level of centralization of decision making in buy-
ing textbooks and setting curriculum (1p school control, 3p
national control; PREAL)
Inventory and maintenance Average of the level of centralization of decision making in
school supply inventory and building maintenance (1 p
school control, 3 p national control; PREAL)
Sources. C: child survey or test; Pr: principal’s survey; T: teacher’s survey; P: parent’s survey; S: survey
designer’s observation; PREAL: estimate taken from Partnership for Educational Revitalization in the
Americas (PREAL 2002).
Note. Notation in parentheses shows the link between the conceptual variable and its empirical con-
struct. Subscripts are suppressed for notational convenience.
TABLE A2
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max.
Endogenous variables:
Math score (q) 10,411 14.76 6.04 .00 32.00
Language score (q) 11,451 11.34 4.29 .00 19.00
Autonomy (a1) 10,411 7.50 1.10 4.00 9.68
Participation (a2) 10,411 2.25 .67 1.30 3.90
Shortage (x) 10,411 3.76 .98 2.33 6.04
Exogenous variables:
Child:
Age 10,411 9.94 1.63 6.00 18.00
Boy 10,411 .50 .50 .00 1.00
Parent/household:
P Educ 10,411 .93 .22 .00 1.00
P Books 10,411 2.26 .85 1.00 4.00
P Spanish 10,411 .93 .25 .00 1.00
Community:
Small urban 10,411 .30 .46 .00 1.00
Rural-adj 10,411 .47 .50 .00 1.00
Rural-iso 10,411 .04 .19 .00 1.00
Instruments:
Hiring and promotions 10,411 2.12 .54 1.50 3.00
Books and curriculum 10,411 2.08 .61 1.50 3.00
Inventory and maintenance 10,411 1.72 .51 1.00 2.50
Note. These are the sample statistics from the group for which we have mathematics test scores. Sample
statistics for the language test sample are almost identical. Notations in parentheses show the link
between the conceptual variable and its empirical construct. Subscripts are suppressed for notational
convenience.
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